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Jurisdiction 
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 78A-4-103(2)(a), 103(2)(j). 
Statement of Issues, Standard of Review, preservation 
Stevens-Henager College filed claims against Eagle 0ate College, Provo College, 
and Jana Miller (collectively "Eagle Gate") seeking both injunctive relief and damages 
under various legal theories. In short, Eagle Gate engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-
Henager employees, had those employees steal computer files containing leads for 
potential Stevens-Henager students, and then used those leads to increase Eagle Gate's 
student population and decrease Stevens-Henager's student population. 
Eagle Gate moved for summary judgment on all claims, not on the ground that 
Eagle Gate did not engage in the alleged unlawful conduct, but on the sole ground that, as 
a matter of law, Stevens-Henager could not provide any evidence that it was damaged as 
a result of Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct. 
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in ruling that Stevens-Henager had 
provided no evidence of its damages, where Stevens-Henager did not precisely quantify 
its damages but did provide evidence that Eagle Gate's condbct caused the following 
types of damage: (i) reduced productivity due to lost employees; (ii) costs of hiring and 
training less productive employees; (iii) costs of advertising land marketing efforts made 
ineffective when student leads were stolen; (iv) effects of reduced morale on numerous 
campuses; and (v) lost tuition payments from students who Otherwise would have 
attended Stevens-Henager. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness and views "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
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therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
UT2,1J6, 177P.3d600. 
Preservation: Stevens-Henager preserved this issue in its opposition to Eagle 
Gate's motion for summary judgment. (R. 3311, 3491, 3693.) 
After the summary judgment ruling, the district court entered a number of orders 
based upon its summary judgment ruling. If summary judgment was inappropriate, this 
court should vacate those subsequent orders. 
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in subsequent rulings that were based, at 
least in part, upon its erroneous summary judgment ruling, including (i) dismissing 
Stevens-Henager's claim for injunctive relief and attorney fees under the Federal 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on the ground that a plaintiff must first prove damages 
totaling at least $5,000; (ii) granting a motion in limine to preclude Stevens-Henager 
from presenting any evidence of damages at trial; and (iii) striking Stevens-Henager's 
expert report concerning damages. 
Standard of Review: "Since the partial summary judgment set into play the 
entire chain of subsequent proceedings, we also reverse all subsequent orders and 
judgments and remand the case for trial." McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1987). 
Preservation: Stevens-Henager preserved these issues in opposing Eagle Gate's 
(i) motion for summary judgment on the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim, 
(ii) motion in limine to preclude Stevens-Henager from presenting any evidence of 
damages at trial, and (iii) motion to strike the expert report. (R. 3950, 4292, 4293.) 
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Determinative Provisions 
R u l e Mi. I (l» r IK: iili I t i i l r n.l "(! Vvil I1 tocedure 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, A summary judgment. 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense requu« " ~ pporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may inot rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing \o lik 
such a response, 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine 
issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported b\ citation 
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in ihc 
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless controverted by the responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memoranda .iwu i<n .ummarv juauineni >i^;, „v,.. 
a verbatim restatement of each . * m*. mwv ,,,5 Fc.ri> "s facts that is controverted, and ma> 
contain a separate statement ,M additional facts in dispute For each of the moving parts's 
facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds 
for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, 
each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves Stevens-Henager's claims against Eagle Gate and others 
stemming from Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager's employees, those 
employees stealing Stevens-Henager's confidential computer files containing leads for 
potential students, and Eagle Gate then using those confidential student leads to increase 
Eagle Gate's revenues and decrease Stevens-Henager's revenues. This appeal concerns 
whether (i) Stevens-Henager provided any evidence of its damages in opposing Eagle 
Gate's motion for summary judgment and (ii) if so, whether various subsequent rulings 
based upon the entry of summary judgment therefore also should be vacated. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
The claims relevant to this appeal are directed at Eagle Gate College, Provo 
College, and Jana Miller (collectively "Eagle Gate"). In the complaint, Stevens-Henager 
sought both injunctive relief and damages for (i) breach of contract; (ii) violation of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (iii) interference with contractual relations; (iv) interference 
with prospective economic relations; (v) violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act; (vi) unfair competition; and (vii) civil conspiracy. (R. 1-30.) 
Because the issues on appeal concern whether the district court erred in granting 
Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment, all facts will be construed in the light most 
favorable to Stevens-Henager. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 6, 177 P.3d 600. In 
addition, because Eagle Gate does not dispute liability in its motion for summary 
judgment, liability must be assumed. Id Therefore, Stevens-Henager provides only 
minimal background on the conduct that gives rise to Eagle Gate's liability. 
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Sometime in 2003, Eagle Gate executed a predatory hiring scheme targeting 
Stevens-Henager employees, ,m l,"l«!«i«« ^'"^'ns-lk'iiiijioi s admissions ui'iiMilliiil, IJIIII i 
Miller. (R. 5-6.) Once Ms. Mnlei joined Eagle Gate, she recruited other Stevens-
Henager employees who also inmed Eagle Gate, all in violation ol then employment 
c on it! ac ts i ^  it! i Ste \ ei is-I lei lager (R 6 / ) h i addition, Eagle Gate also attempted to steal 
Stevens-Henager's Polynesian Program by trying to hire Mosese longi and Trevor Smith, 
nJio lira ii (lie ii I oilman sludeiils lien Sle\cns-I lenagei, A Tin" Nh:\ ens-1 lena^er hud spenl 
more than $200,000 on recruiting efforts in the Tongan community, Eagle Gate attempted 
to recruit these employees to enroll the very students they previously had been recruiting 
U»" ^irvms-HenagiT. I H, *"' • X i As a result of the loss of the various employees, Stevens-
Henager had to hire and train ieplacement employees. 
A .. ' • • • . ] . . 
they illegally accessed Stevens-1 lenauer s computer system, misappropriated Stevens-
•Lier > student leads, and altered the contact informatioi: i for sti idei it leads c i 11:1: le 
Stevens-Henager computer system (e.g., changing the telephone number) to prevent 
St vens-Henager from aho contacting those potential students. (R. 7 1 ^ > F a g l e G a t e 
ilipni ihnil Ihosi ' iiihli in lr.ul in m i inn in'U iliiiijnnil i in l - a g l c d a l e i IIU j 
I I iiyle (date 's IVI iiliNiiii f o r S i i n n i i i i ry J u d g m e n t 
' ( I d " I , u . ' k < i . i d 
the sole ground that Stevens-Henager had failed to "provide evidence of an essential 
element of the claims," namely damages. (R. .> : agle Gate did not move for 
luminal's indium nl I I in in ili ill il ,1 aTfiiii] vMvi >r\ of damages. :- , nstead directed its 
motion to all claims on the ground that Stevens-Henager could not prove any damages. 
i n i43ir; 5 
Eagle Gate first argued that Stevens-Henager had failed to provide evidence of its 
damages through various discovery mechanisms such as interrogatories and initial 
disclosures. (R. 3143-49.) From this, Eagle Gate then concluded that "the lack of any 
evidence or computation of damages . . . demonstrates that [Stevens-Henager] cannot 
prove any damages." (R. 3155.) 
On October 25, 2007, Stevens-Henager opposed the motion for summary 
judgment in three ways: (i) pointing out that Stevens-Henager's ability to quantify 
definitively some of its damages required information from Eagle Gate (e.g., which of 
Eagle Gate's students were recruited from the lead list stolen from Stevens-Henager); 
(ii) citing discovery responses that did describe evidence of Stevens-Henager's damages; 
and, importantly for purposes of this appeal, (iii) quoting deposition testimony that 
outlines Stevens-Henager's damages. (R. 3312-35.) Stevens-Henager argued that the 
deposition testimony is sufficient evidence of its damages to preclude summary 
judgment.1 (R. 3337.) Stevens-Henager also argued that it would provide an expert 
report with a "detailed calculation of its damages" as soon as Eagle Gate provided 
documents necessary for that report. (R. 3331, 3337.) While Stevens-Henager 
represented that "many" of its damages were "quantifiable only through expert 
testimony," it did not represent that expert testimony was required to establish all of its 
damages. (R. 3337.) For that reason, the issue this court must resolve is whether the 
deposition testimony was sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
1
 Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 
inappropriate if deposition testimony demonstrates a "genuine issue as to any material 
fact." 
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Evidence of Stevens-Henager's Damages 
. ..t tiqioHiiliiiii lesliiiioin, \na\ ink nil In1, \iv\ tins 1 l luu^/ i in «»ppusnijj sinniiMiy 
jii ldgment was as follows: Carol Gastiger—President of Stevens-Henager's Provo 
Campus—testified that when Eagle Gate engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager 
;: i i ipl ;:»; ees, had tl lose < r« »n1n\ 'pes steal computer files from Stevens-Henager, and then 
used those stolen files , dermine Stevens-Henager's efforts to recruit new stiJdents 
v ^ : . - -w.-: iaLi; U i ' k T O J '!*. t l l l o n 111»J l l l l I Illl.llil'S. I II II II II I IS •» 11 II I I I ! 1 I (1i IV ill II |1i(l |III i l , l l l lHlir 
and the money Stevens-Henager spent recruiting that population; and (ii) reduced 
productivity from the loss of Stevens-Henager's "Admissions Consultant," where tlle lost 
i'( »iisiili('iii( had averaged 8 student recruits per month but her replacement at Stevens-
Henager averaged only 5 student recnlits per month, which resulted in lost tuition dollars 
(I 3332-33.) 
Vicki Dewsnup—President of Stevens-Henager's Ogden Campus and Regional 
Director of Stevens-Henager—testified tl lat Ste\ ens-Henager si iffered '" 'tremendoi is 
damage" in (i) the costs of "advertising and marketing" that were ineffecth e when Eagle 
Gate misappropriated the student leads the advertising and marketing had generated; 
mi I I i Ilii iiii.ibiilih nl S(c\niv-I IUI.HMT In nmiih I i( -i 'ihulnil leads becn-w ! ;mle < -:\\ 
unlawful conduct had left Stevens-Henager withoiit "adequate phone numbers: (iii) the 
"damage 
Carl Barney—owner of Stevens-Henager—testified that Stevens-Henager had 
suffered damages of "many millions of ti ohuc> iruin u - u e "loss of the [student] starts'" " 
foi "at least tw c • :)f the campi ises, I }m\ o and Ogden," which Jed to a reduction in "an 
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income stream over three or four years;" (ii) having "to rebuild the admissions 
department;" and (iii) the "decline in morale." (R. 3334-35.) 
On November 5, 2007, Eagle Gate filed its reply memorandum, arguing that 
Stevens-Henager still had provided "no evidence of damages." (R. 3483 at 2.) Eagle 
Gate argued that the deposition testimony did not create a disputed issue of fact as to 
damages because the deposition testimony is "self-serving," or "wholly speculative," or 
"vague." (R. 3483 at 8.) 
C. The District Court Grants Eagle Gate's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
On January 30, 2008, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 3564.) In its ruling, the court states that "the parties agree that expert testimony is 
needed in order to establish damages in this case." (R. 3565.) Of course, Stevens-
Henager had only stated that many—not all—of its damages were "quantifiable only 
through expert testimony." (R. 3337.) Thus, at most, Stevens-Henager had noted that 
expert testimony would be needed for certain damages.2 (R. 3574:12.) 
Moreover, to the extent expert testimony was needed, Stevens-Henager was 
precluded from providing an expert report when Eagle Gate provided documents to 
Stevens-Henager only 2 days before the expert report deadline, which, in turn, caused 
Stevens-Henager to file a motion to extend the expert report deadline. And Stevens-
Henager did not provide an expert report because the district court did not resolve the 
motion to extend discovery deadlines until it ruled on the summary judgment motion. 
2
 In fact, expert testimony is not required here. Even where proximate cause requires 
expert testimony, damages do not. Fratto v. Hensley, 2009 UT App 107, ^ f 5, 2009 Utah 
App. LEXIS 110; Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr„ 2007 UT App 235,1f 15, 166 P.3d 614. 
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(R. 3566.) In addition, Stevens-Henager had pending a motion to compel production of 
the documents it needed to complete its expert report at the time it filed its motion to 
extend the expert report deadline. (R. 3492-98.) 
Based upon the mistaken assumption that expert testimony was required for 
Stevens-Henager to prove any damages, the district court granted the motion on the 
ground that the expert report deadline had passed, and therefore, Stevens-Henager could 
not introduce expert testimony to substantiate its damages. (R. 3564-68.) The district 
court cited no case law and provided no analysis as to why the deposition testimony does 
not create a question of fact concerning damages. (R. 3681.) 
On March 25, 2008, Stevens-Henager filed a motion to reconsider the order 
granting summary judgment. (R. 3693.) In support of the motion to reconsider, Stevens-
Henager pointed out that it had provided the court ample non-expert testimony of its 
damages to preclude summary judgment. (R. 3696.) In addition, Stevens-Henager urged 
the court to reinstate its request for injunctive relief, as that relief does not require expert 
testimony of damages. (R. 3696.) 
On May 12, 2008, the district court granted the motion to reconsider and reinstated 
Stevens-Henager's claims to the extent they seek equitable relief instead of damages. 
(R. 3988.) However, the district court again assumed that Stevens-Henager could not 
prove any damages without an expert, and therefore, declined to vacate its dismissal of 
the damage claims because Stevens-Henager had not provided "timely expert reports." 
(R. 3987.) 
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D. The District Court Grants Other Motions Based Upon the Erroneous 
Grant of Summary Judgment 
On May 30, 2008, the district court granted Eagle Gate's motion to strike the 
report of Stevens-Henager's damages expert "[b]ased on the Court's prior rulings," 
including the rulings on Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment and Stevens-
Henager's motion to reconsider the order granting summary judgment. (R. 3994.) On 
August 31, 2009, the district court granted Eagle Gate's motion in limine to exclude any 
evidence of monetary damages—a motion necessary only because there is evidence of 
monetary damages—on the ground that the remaining prayer for injunctive relief does 
not require proof of damages, and therefore, evidence of monetary damages is irrelevant. 
(R. 4368.) Also on August 31, 2009, the district court dismissed Stevens-Henager's 
claim for injunctive relief and attorney fees under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act on the ground that Stevens-Henager could not prove damages totaling at least $5,000, 










Summary of the Argument 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that Stevens-
Henager had provided no evidence of its damages. In fact, Stevens-Henager provided 
deposition testimony from three witnesses that demonstrates how Stevens-Henager 
suffered damages when Eagle Gate engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager 
employees, had those employees steal computer files containing leads for potential 
Stevens-Henager students, and then used those leads to increase Eagle Gate's student 
population and decrease Stevens-Henager's student population. 
Under Utah law, once a plaintiff provides sufficient evidence of proximate cause, 
a jury is "entitled to determine the extent of Plaintiff s damages" and the plaintiff does 
not need to "precisely identify" the extent of its damages. Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr., 2007 
UT App 235,1flj 17-18, 166 P.3d 614. Rather, "[w]hen evidence supports a finding of the 
fact of damage, i.e., proximate cause, a defendant should not escape liability because the 
amount of damage cannot be proved with precision." Id, If 2 )^. 
Under Rule 56(c), deposition testimony may be used to demonstrate a "genuine 
issue as to any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Stevens-Henager provided 
deposition testimony that Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct was the proximate cause of a 
number of different types of damages, including (i) the lost productivity of the 
experienced employees stolen by Eagle Gate; (ii) the costs of hiring and training less 
experienced and less productive employees; (iii) the costs associated with ineffective 
advertising and marketing when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that advertising 
and marketing; (iv) the effects of reduced morale on various campuses; and (v) the lost 
tuition payments from students who otherwise would have attended Stevens-Henager. 
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Stevens-Henager even quantified the reduction in student recruits after one of its 
experienced employees joined Eagle Gate as 3 students per month, a number that can 
easily be translated into lost tuition dollars. The deposition testimony is more than 
sufficient to create a question of fact concerning damages for the jury. The district court 
erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. 
The district court then based a number of subsequent rulings upon its erroneous 
summary judgment ruling, including (i) dismissing Stevens-Henager's claim for 
injunctive relief and attorney fees under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on 
the ground that a plaintiff must first prove damages totaling at least $5,000; (ii) granting a 
motion in limine to preclude Stevens-Henager from presenting evidence of damages at 
trial; and (iii) striking Stevens-Henager's expert report concerning damages. 
This court not only should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment, 











The issue before this court is whether the district court erred in granting Eagle 
Gate's Rule 56 motion for summary judgment on the groundthat Stevens-Henager had 
not provided evidence of "any damages" sufficient to create a disputed issue of material 
fact for the jury. Put differently, the issue is whether Stevens-Henager, in opposing Eagle 
Gate's motion for summary judgment, provided evidence sufficient to create a question 
of fact as to whether it suffered "any damages" as a result of [Eagle Gate's unlawful 
conduct. As demonstrated below, Stevens-Henager provided ample evidence to preclude 
judgment as a matter of law. This court should reverse. 
Before addressing this issue, however, it is important to be clear about what issues 
are not before this court. The briefing and rulings in the district court discuss a number 
of tangential issues, which may have clouded the issues before the district court. What is 
not before the court is (i) a Rule 11 motion for sanctions concerning the amount of 
damages listed in the complaint; (ii) a Rule 37 motion for discovery sanctions for failing 
to cooperate in the discovery process; (iii) a sanction for failure to update initial 
disclosures under Rule 26(a); or (iv) whether Stevens-Henagpr could have provided more 
evidence of damages in opposing summary judgment. Nor does this appeal involve a 
motion for summary judgment directed at a particular category of damages. Instead, this 
appeal involves a motion for summary judgment contending that Stevens-Henager could 
not prove "any damages." (R. 3155.) It is this issue that SteVens-Henager addresses in 
this brief. 
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I. Stevens-Henager Provided Sufficient Evidence of Its Damages to Preclude 
Summary Judgment 
Stevens-Henager provided sufficient evidence of its damages in opposing Eagle 
Gate's motion for summary judgment. Under Utah law, summary judgment is 
appropriate only when, viewing "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," there exists "no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr.. 2007 UT App 235, % 13, 166 P.3d 614. Importantly, review of 
summary judgment rulings should be "guided by the general judicial policy that favors a 
trial on the merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment." 
King v. Searle Pharms., Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 864-65 (Utah 1992). 
Here, Eagle Gate moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that Stevens-
Henager could not prove that it suffered "any damages" as a result of Eagle Gate's 
unlawful conduct, which consisted of Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager's 
employees, those employees stealing Stevens-Henager's computer files containing leads 
for potential students, and Eagle Gate then using that confidential information to increase 
Eagle Gate's revenues and decrease Stevens-Henager's revenues. Apart from the 
obvious damage resulting from such conduct, Stevens-Henager provided more than 
enough evidence of its damages to preclude summary judgment. 
Below, Stevens-Henager will first outline the legal standard concerning what 
evidence of damages is required to preclude summary judgment and then set forth the 
evidence Stevens-Henager provided to demonstrate that Stevens-Henager satisfied that 
standard. 
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A. Under Utah Law, Evidence That Unlawful Conduct Was the Proximate 
Cause of Damage Is Sufficient to Preclude Summary Judgment 
Stevens-Henager did not need to precisely identify the extent of its damages in 
opposing summary judgment. Under Utah law, once a plaintiff provides evidence of an 
injury, the plaintiff does not need to "precisely identify the extent of Plaintiff s damages." 
Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr., 2007 UT App 235,1j 17, 166 P.3d 614. Because damages 
present a question of fact that is "distinctly within the jury's province," once a plaintiff 
provides sufficient evidence of proximate cause, a jury is "erititled to determine the extent 
of Plaintiff s damages." Id^f 18 (quoting Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 103 P.3d 135). 
In Sohm, like here, the defendant moved for summary judgment on "the extent of 
Plaintiffs recoverable damages and Plaintiffs evidence regarding the same." Id. f^ 14. 
The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had not 
provided sufficient evidence of damages. The plaintiff had provided only testimony that 
plaintiffs lost vision resulted from medical malpractice, but no evidence of "how much 
better" plaintiffs vision would have been in the absence of the malpractice or the 
monetary value of that loss. Id. f^ 20. This court reversed, holding that evidence the 
defendant caused plaintiff to lose some vision was sufficient to allow a jury to award 
non-speculative damages, even though the plaintiff provided no quantification of 
damages in opposing summary judgment. Id. f^ 19. As this court explained, "[w]hen 
evidence supports a finding of the fact of damage, i.e., proximate cause, a defendant 
should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with 
precision." Id. f 20. 
Confirming that a quantification of damages is not necessary to preclude summary 
judgment, this court has held that evidence of the fact of damages at trial is sufficient to 
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preclude a directed verdict. Renegade Oil Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 
App 356, If 13, 101 P.3d 383. In Renegade Oil the plaintiff presented evidence that but 
for the insurance company's negligence the plaintiff would not have had to defend a 
personal injury lawsuit himself. Id. fflf 11, 13. While the plaintiff presented evidence at 
trial of the existence of that personal injury lawsuit, it presented no calculation of its 
damages, i.e., the costs associated with the lawsuit. Id. f^ 4. The defendant moved for 
directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence of his 
damages, but the trial court denied the motion and this court affirmed. This court 
reasoned that, even though the plaintiff had provided no evidence of the costs associated 
with the personal injury lawsuit, by proving that plaintiff had, in fact, suffered damages, 
"the amount of damages would equal the costs related to the [personal injury] lawsuit that 
otherwise would have been covered by the policy." Id f^ 13. Thus, Renegade Oil 
confirms that evidence of the fact of damages is sufficient to preclude judgment as a 
matter of law even in the absence of a calculation of the amount of damages. 
A recent Utah Supreme Court case provides further confirmation. Anderson Dev. 
Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,133, 116 P.3d 323. In Tobias, the court reversed the entry of 
summary judgment where the plaintiff provided evidence of the fact of damages, but not 
the amount of damages. Id. In Tobias, plaintiff provided evidence that it had paid more 
for real estate due to defendants' misrepresentation, but provided no evidence of how 
much more it had paid. Id The Utah Supreme Court nonetheless reversed the entry of 
summary judgment because even this "thin" evidence was sufficient to present a non-
speculative question of fact concerning damages for trial. Id. Again, proof that 
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defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of damages is sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment, even in the absence of a quantification of those damages. 
B. Stevens-Henager Provided Evidence That Eagle Gate's Unlawful 
Conduct Was the Proximate Cause of Damages to Stevens-Henager 
Stevens-Henager provided ample evidence of its damages and demonstrated that 
Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct was the proximate cause of those damages. Therefore, 
summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Carol Gastiger, a Campus President of Stevens-Henager, testified that when Eagle 
Gate engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager employees, had those employees 
steal computer files from Stevens-Henager, and then used those stolen files to undermine 
Stevens-Henager's efforts to recruit new students, Stevens-Henager suffered the 
following damages: (i) a "loss of the Tongan population" and the money Stevens-
Henager spent recruiting that population; and (ii) reduced productivity from the loss of 
Stevens-Henager's "Admissions Consultant," where the stolen consultant had averaged 
8 student recruits per month but her replacement averaged oflly 5 per month, which 
resulted in lost tuition dollars. (R. 3332-33.) 
Ms. Gastiger even performed a calculation to demonstrate the extent of damages 
to Stevens-Henager. Ms. Gastiger testified that when you take the number of fewer 
students recruited by the replacement employee—3 per mon^h—and "multiply that times 
tuition," then that is "real money, in my opinion, that's been lost." (R. 3332-33.) In 
addition, there is a straightforward way to determine the damages associated with the 
money Stevens-Henager spent recruiting the Tongan population before Eagle Gate 
illegally enticed the director of those recruiting efforts to joih Eagle Gate and recruit the 
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same potential students. The costs of those undermined recruiting efforts are hard costs. 
Like Renegade Oil the record here reveals a straightforward way to arrive at a dollar 
amount of damages—lost tuition from 3 fewer student recruits per month and the hard 
costs associated with marketing and recruiting efforts. 
Vicki Dewsnup, another Campus President of Stevens-Henager and its Regional 
Director, testified about "tremendous damage" including (i) the costs of "advertising and 
marketing" that were ineffective when Eagle Gate misappropriated the student leads the 
advertising and marketing had generated; (ii) the inability of Stevens-Henager to contact 
its student leads because Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct had left Stevens-Henager 
without "adequate phone numbers;" (iii) the "damage to morale at the campuses;" and 
(iv) the "loss of employees." (R. 3333-34.) 
Carl Barney, owner of Stevens-Henager, testified that Stevens-Henager had 
suffered damages of "many millions of dollars" from (i) the "loss of the [student] starts" 
for "at least two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden," which led to a reduction in "an 
income stream over three or four years;" (ii) having "to rebuild the admissions 
department;" and (iii) the "decline in morale." (R. 3334-35.) 
Stevens-Henager therefore provided evidence that Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct 
was the proximate cause of a number of different types of damages, including (i) the lost 
productivity of the experienced employees who joined Eagle Gate; (ii) the costs of hiring 
and training less experienced and less productive employees; (iii) the costs associated 
with advertising and marketing when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that 
3
 Stevens-Henager attributed a dollar amount of $200,000 to these damages as early as 
the complaint. (R. 7-8.) 
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advertising and marketing; (iv) the effects of reduced morale on various campuses; and 
(v) the lost tuition payments from students who otherwise would have attended Stevens-
Henager.4 This evidence is more than sufficient to create a question of fact concerning 
damages for the jury to consider and, more important, to prevent Eagle Gate from 
escaping entirely from compensating Stevens-Henager for the consequences of Eagle 
Gate's illegal conduct. 
Because Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment was fashioned to address 
only whether Stevens-Henager had suffered "any damages," when Stevens-Henager 
provided some evidence of damages, the motion should have been denied in its entirety. 
This court should reverse the order granting summary judgment to permit Stevens-
Henager to present evidence of its damages to a jury. 
II. This Court Should Vacate Subsequent Rulings Based Upon the District 
Court's Summary Judgment Ruling 
If this court reverses the district court's grant of summary judgment, it also should 
reverse subsequent orders based upon the grant of summary judgment. McKee v. 
Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Since the partial summary judgment 
set into play the entire chain of subsequent proceedings, we also reverse all subsequent 
orders and judgments and remand the case for trial."); see al^o Loporto v. Hoegemann, 
The categories of damages are confirmed by Stevens-Henager's initial disclosures: 
"Such damage includes (1) damage to Stevens-Henager's goodwill resulting from 
Defendants' acts, (2) damage to or destruction of Stevens-Henager's lead lists, 
(3) damage resulting from Defendants' misappropriation of Stevens-Henager's lead lists, 
(4) lost investment and productivity due to Defendants' predatory hiring of key Stevens-
Henager personnel, (5) lost revenues due to an untold number of prospective students 
electing not to attend Stevens-Henager as a result of defendants' unlawful and unfair 
competition, etc." (R. 3700.) 
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1999 UT App 175,115, 982 P.2d 586 ("we reverse the trial court's entry of default and 
subsequent orders based on that default"). 
In this case, there are at least three subsequent orders based upon the district 
court's summary judgment ruling. First, on May 30, 2008, the district court granted 
Eagle Gate's motion to strike the report of Stevens-Henager's damages expert "[b]ased 
on the Court's prior rulings," including the rulings on Eagle Gate's motion for summary 
judgment and Stevens-Henager's motion to reconsider the order granting summary 
judgment. (R. 3994.) Second, on August 31, 2009, the district court granted Eagle 
Gate's motion in limine to exclude any evidence of monetary damages—a motion 
necessary only because there is evidence of monetary damages—on the ground that the 
remaining prayer for injunctive relief does not require proof of damages, and therefore, 
evidence of monetary damages is irrelevant. (R. 4368.) Third, on August 31, 2009, the 
district court dismissed Stevens-Henager's claim for injunctive relief and attorney fees 
under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on the ground that Stevens-Henager 
could not prove damages totaling at least $5,000, a requirement under the Act. (R. 4366.) 
Because these orders are based, at least in part, on the district court's grant of 
summary judgment, if this court reverses the order granting summary judgment, this 
court should also vacate these subsequent orders to permit the district court to consider 
them in the absence of its summary judgment ruling. 
Conclusion 
This court should reverse the order granting summary judgment because, in 
opposing the motion for summary judgment, Stevens-Henager provided sufficient 
evidence of its damages through deposition testimony to create an issue of material fact 
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for trial. Because the district court erred in its summary judgment ruling, this court also 
should vacate all subsequent orders based upon that ruling. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2010. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Troy L. Bbotie 
Attorneyjor Appellant Stevens-Henager 
College 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 040921860 
This matter came before the Court on January 22, 2007, in connection 
with Defendants Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, The Court will refer to these parties 
herein as the "Eagle Gate Parties." At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the 
parties' respective legal positions, their written submissions and 
counsel's oral argument. The Court should note that during the hearing, 
a representative of Eagle Gate College was permitted to speak briefly on 
the issue of what was contained in documents that were produced by the 
Eagle Gate Parties in November of 2007. While these statements provided 
helpful clarification, the Court did not rely on them in forming its 
decision on the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court rules on 
that Motion as stated herein. 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE 
V. EAGLE GATE COLLEGE PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that the 
Plaintiff has failed to provide the basis for and a calculation 
supporting its damages claim. The Plaintiff counters that an expert 
opinion concerning damages has been delayed because the Eagle Gate 
Parties have only recently provided information necessary to compute 
damages. 
Notably, the parties agree that expert testimony is needed in order 
to establish damages in this case. Further, in reviewing the procedural 
history of this matter, which spans over four years, it is apparent that 
the Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to designate an expert on 
damages, to formulate the basis of its damages claim and to provide an 
expert report concerning the same. 
During the hearing, it became clear that the information which would 
substantiate such damages is, at least in part, in the Plaintiff's own 
possession. Further, the Court is satisfied that through discovery the 
Plaintiff has been able to glean the remaining information necessary for 
its experts to assess damages and to issue a report concerning the same. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court carefully considered, but was 
unpersuaded by the Plaintiff s theory that the information provided by 
the Eagle Gate Parties was "substantially incomplete" until the November 
supplementation. In this regard, the Plaintiff relies heavily on the 
fact that the Court previously ordered supplementation of a "lead list" 
STEVENS -HENAGER COLLEGE 
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and spreadsheet provided by the Eagle Gate Parties, to the extent that 
this information was incomplete. To be clear, the Court determines that 
even in the absence of such supplementation, tl^ e Plaintiff had already 
been provided sufficient information for it$ experts to calculate 
damages. Despite this, the Plaintiff has failed to produce any 
calculations or expert reports concerning damages and all relevant 
deadlines have now passed. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff alluded to having previously sought to 
extend the deadlines in this case and indicate^ that the Court had not 
yet ruled on that Motion. The Plaintiff did fil^ a Motion to Extend the 
Dates Set Forth in the Order Granting Plaintifif's to Extend Discovery 
Period on June 26, 2007. It appears that this Motion may have been 
overlooked because of the flurry of other Motions which were pending at 
that time. However, as the Court pointed out during the hearing, the 
Plaintiff has effectively had nearly six months (rather than the 60 days 
sought) to have its experts complete their expert reports on damages. 
Despite the passage of this extensive time period, the Plaintiff is 
apparently no closer to submitting an expert report than it was when the 
request for extension was filed. 
It should also be noted that the Plaintiff has requested extensions 
in the past, which the Court has previously grafted. However, at this 
juncture, there is simply no excuse or justification for the Plaintiff's 
delays in providing expert reports and computations of its damages. 
STEVENS -HRNAGER COLLEGE 
V- EAGLE GATE COLLEGE PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Indeed, while the Plaintiff had sufficient information to formulate the 
basis for Its damages claim and to provide expert reports, even if on a 
preliminary basis, it apparently made a tactical decision not to do so. 
The Plaintiff, and not the Eagle Gate Parties, bears responsibility for 
having failed in this regard. 
The Court is similarly unpersuaded by counsel's suggestion that 
until causation could be assessed, it was impossible for the Plaintiff 
to calculate damages. The factual issues surrounding causation in this 
case are not the subject of expert testimony and would not preclude the 
Plaintiff from making the separate assessment of damages (again, even if 
on a preliminary basis). 
Overall, the Court determines that despite this late stage in the 
litigation, the Plaintiff has failed entirely to substantiate its damages 
claim. Further, the Court is simply not persuaded that the Plaintiff has 
been unable to do so because of a lack of information. The Court 
reiterates that the Plaintiff has had sufficient information to compute 
damages, but has failed to produce any calculations or expert reports to 
substantiate its damages claim and the time for doing so has now expired. 
In the absence of evidence to substantiate the damages element of the 
Plaintiff's claims, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the 
Eagle Gate Parties. 
Counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties is to prepare an Order 
consistent, but not limited to, this Memorandum Decision, indicating that 
STEVENS -HENAGER COLLEGE 
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their Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Counsel should include a 
procedural history detailing the information provided, extensions granted 
and the Plaintiff's failure to produce expert reports or calculations of 
damages (despite repeated requests by the Eagle Gate Parties). 
Dated this of January, 2008. 
ROBERT P. FAU 
DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, j 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO 
COLLEGE, MOSESEIONGI, TREVOR 
SMITH, WALLACE ROGERS, 
RICHARD HORWITZ, STEVEN TODD 
KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON 
ITS CLAIMS AGAINST EAGLE GATE 
COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE AND 
JANA MILLER (Breach Of Contract; 
Violation Of The Uniform Trade Secret 
Act; Interference With Contractual 
Relations; Violation Of The Federal 
Computer Fraud And Abuse Act; 
Statutory Unfair Competition; And Civil 
Conspiracy) 
Case No. 040921860 
Judge Robert Faust 
Eagle Gate College, Provo College, and Jana Millers (the "Eagle Gate Parties") Motion 
for Summary Judgment (re: Claims Against Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller) 
came on for hearing before the Court on January 22, 2008. The Eagle Gate Parties were 
represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Nathan B. Wilcox and Jennifer R. Eshelman of Anderson 
& Karrenberg. Plaintiff was represented by Robert E. Mansfield, Scott M. Lilja and Lisa B. 
Bohman of VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy. The Court, having carefully reviewed and 
considered the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties with respect to the Motion, and 
having rendered its Memorandum Decision on January 30, 2008, hereby enters the following 
order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision dated January 30, 2008, and set 
forth in further detail below, the Eagle Gate Parties> Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiffs claims for Breach of Contract, Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, 
Violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Statutory Unfair Competition, and 
Civil Conspiracy are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Procedural History 
On October 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against the Eagle Gate Parties, among 
others, asserting claims for Breach of Contract,1 Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, 
Violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Statutory Unfair Competition, and 
The Breach of Contract Claim was only asserted against Ms. Miller. 
Civil Conspiracy. (Statement of Facts ("SOF") fl 1 and 2?) For its causes of action, Plaintiff 
claimed over three years ago that it had incurred, and was therefore entided to, damages in amounts 
"not less than" $10,250,000.00. (See Compl. pp. 27 - 30.)3 Despite the averments in its Complaint 
of damages of not less than $10,250,000.00, on November 15, 2004, Plaintiff represented in its 
Initial Disclosures that it had "not yet computed the damages it has suffered as alleged in the 
Complaint" (SOFK5.) 
On November 18,2004, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel 
requesting that in light of the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint of damages in specified minimum 
amounts and its admission that it had not computed any damages, Plaintiff either supplement its 
Initial Disclosures or amend its Complaint (SOF ^ 6.) Counsel for Plaintiff responded that 
2
 The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment cited to a "Statement of Facts." Plaintiff 
responded to facts nos. 1, 2, 3, 10, 15, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 31, as "Undisputed" or 
"Undisputed and immaterial,5' and facts nos. 4, 5, 6, 14, 22, as "Undisputed but incomplete" and cited 
additional information. These facts are uncontroverted pursuant to Rule 7(cX3XA) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and deemed admitted. 
3
 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that it was entitled to damages against the Eagle Gate 
Parties in the following amounts for the following claims: 
"not less than the sum of $250,000" — breach of contract against Ms. Miller individually (see Compl. 
p. 27); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" — violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (see Compl. p. 
28); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" - interference with contractual relations (see id); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" — interference with prospective economic relations (see 
Compl. p. 29); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" — violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (see id. ); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000"- statutory unfair competition (see Compl. p. 30; and 
"not less than the sum of $5,000,000" - civil conspiracy (see id.). 
(SOF p . ) 
3 
"Plaintiff was not able to give a detailed computation of its damages at that point in the litigation." 
(Plaintiffs Responses to SOF ] 6.) 
Thereafter, the Eagle Gate Parties' counsel contacted Plaintiffs counsel to request that 
Plaintiff identify the factual basis for its claim in its Complaint that it had damages in excess of 
$10,000,000.00, including the computation thereof. (SOF % 7.4) In response, Plaintiffs counsel 
represented that the computations were simply an estimate made by some of the members of 
Plaintiffs management as to the amount of Plaintiffs damages, but that there were not any specific 
documents or computations on which Plaintiff based its damages allegations in its Complaint (SOF 
17.) 
On December 15, 2004, the Eagle Gate Parties sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel asking 
for clarification of Plaintiffs counsel's representation that tlthe calculation of [damages], as set 
forth in [the] Complaint, was simply a guess by some members of management as to the 
damages that [Plaintiff] may have incurred" and requesting that Plaintiff comply with its 
obligations under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (SOF ^  8.5) 
On December 2, 2004, the Eagle Gate Parties served Plaintiff with Defendants Eagle Gate 
College, Provo College, Richard Horwitz and Jana Miller's First Request for Production of 
Documents. (SOF ^ 9.) In their Requests for Production of Documents, the Eagle Gate Parties 
requested that Plaintiff produce "any and all documents that evidence, refer or relate to, or are 
4
 In response to SOP |^ 7, Plaintiff made a statement about what it did not dispute, but failed to controvert 
any of the facts set forth therein. Thus, the facts set forth in SOP ^ 7 are deemed admitted. 
5
 In response to Statement of Fact No. 8, Plaintiff does not dispute that the letter was sent or the content of 
the letter. 
4 
sufficient to ascertain any damages Stevens-Henager claims to have suffered as a result of any of 
the Defendant's purported misappropriation of the iead list' or other trade secrets." The Eagle Gate 
Parties further requested the production of "all documents that evidence, refer or relate to, or are 
sufficient to ascertain any damages Plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of [the alleged actions of 
the Defendants] including, but not limited to, any computation of such alleged damages." (SOF 
110.) 
On January 10, 2005, Plaintiff responded to each of the Eagle Gate Parties' Requests for 
Production of Documents relating to damages with a verbatim restatement of the explanation set 
forth in its Initial Disclosures: "[Plaintiff] has not yet computed the damages it has suffered To 
the extent any of these categories of damages can be quantified, [Plaintiff] will supplement these 
responses when sufficient information is available by which to make such calculations." (SOF T[l l6 
and Response thereto.) 
On July 1,2005, the Eagle Gate Parties filed a Motion to Compel seeking an order from the 
Honorable Judge Steven Roth compelling Plaintiff to, inter alia, (a) amend its Initial Disclosures 
to provide a damage computation and (b) appropriately respond to the Eagle Gate Parties* 
discovery requests regarding damages. (See Mot to Compel and for Sanctions, July 1, 2005.) 
After hearing oral argument on the matter, Judge Roth ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Eagle 
Gate Parties5 document requests regarding damages. (See Order Re: Mot. to Compel and for 
Sanctions, December 30, 2005.) In response to Judge Roth's Order compelling Plaintiff to 
6
 Plaintiff purported to dispute SOF |^ 11, but the cited evidence does not controvert it. Thus, it is 
admitted. 
5 
produce documents that support its damage claims, in early January 2006, Plaintiff produced 
documents purporting to summarize the "starts" at its various campuses from 2003 to 2005 by 
month and quarter and Quick Books print outs titled General Ledger and Trial Balance for 
Plaintiff at its various campuses. (SOF f 16.7) None of the documents produced contained any 
calculations of damages or explanation as to how the documents supported or evidenced 
Plaintiffs claim of damages in excess of $10,000,000.00. (SOF K 19.8) 
On January 12, 2006, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties again requested in writing that 
Plaintiff provide the underlying documents supporting the summaries and other documents that 
Plaintiff claimed supported its damages. (SOF \ 17.9) Plaintiff, however, did not respond to the 
request by counsel. (SOF [^ 17.) 
On June 9, 2006, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties sent another letter to counsel for 
Plaintiff asking Plaintiff to confirm that there were no other documents relating to Plaintiffs 
claim of over $10,000,000.00 in damages beyond the summaries of starts and the General 
Ledgers and Trial Balances. (SOF % 18.) Plaintiffs counsel did not respond. (SOF ^ 18.10) 
On or about January 17, 2007, Jana Miller served her First Set of Interrogatories on 
Plaintiff. (SOF K 20). Many of Ms. Miller's Interrogatories asked Plaintiff to identify "[a]ll 
7
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
8
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the deposition testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(cX3XA) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
9
 Although Plainttiff purports to dispute this fact and labels it as immaterial, claiming that it need not 
respond to informal requests for documents, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
10
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact and labels it as immaterial, claiming that it need not 
respond to informal requests for documents, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(cX3XA) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6 
damages that [Plaintiff] claimjs] to have [or purportedly] suffered as a result of [the alleged acts 
of Ms. Miller], including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any such 
damages and any facts [Plaintiff) relied upon in computing any alleged damages." (SOF K 21.) 
Plaintiff repeatedly responded to the above referenced requests for information concerning the 
identification and calculation of damages by simply stating that "Plaintiffs experts will provide 
information and analysis concerning the damages suffered."(SOF ^ 22.) 
Similarly, on or about January 17, 2007, Eagle Gate and Provo College served their First 
Set of Interrogatories on Plaintiff. (SOF f 23.) Eagle Gate and Provo College's Interrogatories 
asked Plaintiff to identify "[a]U damages that [Plaintiff] purportedly suffered as a result of [the 
various alleged acts of Eagle Gate or Provo College], including a detailed statement of the 
method of the calculation of any alleged damages and any facts [Plaintiff] relied upon in 
computing any alleged damages." (SOF ^ 24.) Plaintiff repeatedly responded to the requests for 
information concerning damages by stating that "Plaintiffs experts will provide information and 
analysis concerning the damages suffered." (SOF H 25u .) 
In November, 2006, the parties filed a Second Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order 
and the Second Amended Scheduling Order was entered by Judge Skanchy on November 16, 
2006. The November 16,2006 Order established a fact discovery deadline of February 28, 2007, 
and a deadline for expert witness reports of March 9, 2007. On March 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed a 
11
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
7 
motion to extend the discovery cutoff in the case. The basis for its request for an extension of the 
discovery cutoff was specifically stated in its Reply Memorandum as follows: 
In" seeking an extension to conduct fact discovery, Plaintiff seeks 
additional time for only two purposes. First, it seeks an extension 
to permit its experts to review the hard drive of Jana Miller...and 
to follow up on any additional discovery arising from that review. 
Second, it seeks an extension to conduct the out-of-state deposition 
of Todd Knecht, a party to this action whose whereabouts had 
previously been unknown. 
On April 18, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion and extended the pertinent deadlines by 
sixty days, establishing the new deadline for the completion of all fact discovery as June 18, 
2007, and the deadline for Plaintiff to provide any expert witness reports as June 28, 2007. 
Beyond conducting the deposition of Mr. Knecht on June 12, 2007, Plaintiff conducted no 
further discovery during the extended discovery period. 
On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses 
seeking an order compelling contact information for former employees of Plaintiff who had 
subsequently worked for either Eagle Gate College or Provo College12 and to tcproduce a copy of 
Eagle Gate College's database in its original format." The Motion was based, in relevant part, on 
its requests seeking "Copies of each lead list prepared, accessed, modified, or otherwise used in 
carrying out his or her responsibilities to Eagle Gate College by Jana Miller, Todd Knecht and 
Wallace Rogers" and "Documents sufficient to ascertain each and every change or alteration to 
any lead list owned, possessed, or otherwise controlled by Eagle Gate College that were made 
by Jana Miller, Todd Knecht, and Wallace Rogers." 
12
 This information was subsequently provided. 
8 
Eagle Gate and Provo College opposed the Motion, asserting that neither of the document 
requests that Plaintiff referenced requested the production of the entirety of Eagle Gate's 
database. On July 26, 2007, the Court, accordingly entered a Minute Entry ruling that because 
Plaintiff had not requested the database in discovery, the Court could not compel its production. 
The Court also noted, based on the pleadings submitted, that Eagle Gate College and Provo 
College had appropriately responded to the requests by compiling a list of 37,000 names of 
potential students and their contact information and provided a spreadsheet identifying changes 
made to the database by Jana Miller. 
On June 20, 2007, in response to interrogatories from Plaintiff, Provo College and Eagle 
Gate College produced hard copies of spreadsheets identifying all of the "self-generated" leads 
for the individual defendants in this matter. 
On June 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Extend the discovery period seeking 
to extend all of the discovery deadlines and other dates by sixty days from the entry of an order 
granting the Motion to Extend. Plaintiff alleged that it required the requested extension so that it 
could review Eagle Gate College's electronic database in "native format" (a request the Court 
had already declined to compel because it had not been requested in discovery), and to depose 
individuals who formerly worked for Plaintiff who had since worked for Eagle Gate or Provo 
College—a heretofore unmentioned reason for extending discovery. Thereafter, the Plaintiff did 
not do any fiirther discovery of the Eagle Gate Parties. 
On October 9, 2007, the Eagle Gate Parties filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 
all of Plaintiffs claims against them. In the summary judgment motions, the Eagle Gate Parties 
9 
alleged that (a) Plaintiff had failed to provide a basis for, and a calculation of, its damages claim, 
(b) Plaintiff had failed to provide any expert reports substantiating its damages (which it had 
claimed was necessary), and (c) the time for providing expert reports or expert discovery and fact 
discovery had passed. Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment alleging that it 
needed an expert witness to provide a calculation of its damages set forth in its Complaint filed 
in October 2004, and that it had been unable to provide an expert report during the preceding 
three years because the Eagle Gate Parties had only recently provided the information necessary 
for it to do so. 
It is uncontrovertable, however, that based upon what Plaintiff alleges are the categories 
of its damages, it is Plaintiff- not the Eagle-Gate Parties - that possesses material information 
relating to the calculation of PlaintifFs damages. It is also undisputed that the information that 
Plaintiff alleges that it needs from the Eagle Gate Parties to compute its damages has been, at 
least in part, in PlaintifFs possession since before Plaintiff commenced this litigation. 
Specifically, in opposition to the Eagle Gate Parties5 Motion, Plaintiff submitted the deposition 
testimony of PlaintifFs President, Carl Barney, in which Mr. Barney testified that PlaintifFs 
damages consisted of "[t]he loss of starts," "[t]he cost of hiring and training new people" and 
"[t]he efforts to rebuild the admissions department." 
PlaintifFs briefing characterized its damage claim as including "an analysis of the impact 
of Defendants' breach of employment contracts on Stevens-Henager enrollment rates and the 
value of Plaintiff; and an analysis of the increased costs and decreased productivity caused by 
Defendants' poaching of PlaintifFs employees." 
10 
Plaintiff, not the Eagle Gate Parties, possesses the information necessary to calculate its 
alleged damages the loss of employees had on its enrollment rates, the cost of hiring and training 
new people, and the cost of rebuilding its admissions department Yet, it has supplied no 
calculation or evidence regarding these damages whatsoever supporting its damages claims. 
Plaintiff indicated at the hearing that these damages were not the main damages sought by 
Plaintiff. The Court finds this troubling in light of the fact that Plaintiffs Complaint seeks 
damages in an amount "not less than the sum of $1,000,000'* against the Eagle Gate Parties for 
interfering with its contractual relations with its employees.13 
Even if these damages are not the main damages sought by Plaintiff, the fact remains that 
it had a duty to compute them and provide them to the Eagle Gate Parties pursuant to Rule 26 
and the Court's multiple scheduling orders and did not. Moreover, the Eagle Gate Parties 
provided Plaintiff with sufficient information for its expert(s) to calculate, even if preliminarily,14 
the other damages Plaintiff claims.15 
13
 To allege damages in its Complaint in good faith as "not less than" sums, Plaintiff must have engaged 
in some form of computation. Indeed, Rule 11 mandates that Plaintiffs allegations must be based upon 
some reasonable inquiry or belief and have an evidentiary basis. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3); see also 
Rhineheart v. Stcmffer, 638 F. 2d 1169, 1171 (9* Cir. 1980) (before filing complaint, attorney has duty to 
"ascertain that the damages sought appear to bear a reasonable relation to injuries actually sustained"); 
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F. 2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1987) (damages alleged in prayer 
for relief "must meet the Rule 11 standard of reasonableness"). Plaintiffs repeated admission that it has 
not computed its damages is a tacit admission that the allegations of damages in its Complaint in amounts 
of "not less than" $250,000.00, $1,000,000.00, and $5,000,000.00 violate Rule 11. See Simpson v. 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.y 522 A. 2d 880, 884 (D.C. 1987) (response to discovery request that 
answer will be supplied "as discovery continues" is "strong circumstantial evident" that plaintiff lacked 
basis for claims at time of filing; if plaintiffs complaint was based on any pre-filing investigation, 
plaintiff should have revealed that information in discovery). 
14
 Plaintiffs counsel indicated at the hearing of this matter that Plaintiff chose not to provide a 
preliminary analysis due to a concern that it would somehow be used against them at the trial of this 
11 
Plaintiff has failed and refused to substantiate its damages in over three years of 
litigation. Instead, Plaintiff has repeatedly stated the information would be provided through its 
expert witness ieport(s). The deadlines for discovery and expert witness reports have now come 
and gone four times with no expert report or computation of damages from Plaintiff Because 
damages are an essential element of each of PlaintifFs claims against the Eagle Gate Parties, the 
Eagle Gate Parties are entitled to dismissal of PlaintifFs claims against them as a matter of law. 
There is no excuse or justification for PlaintifFs failure to provide expert reports and 
computations of its damages. Accordingly, the time for Plaintiff to have substantiated its 
damages having passed, PlaintifFs claims against the Eagle Gate Parties are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED: March |6N, 2008 
BY THE COT 
^ 4 ^ 
Honorable Robert ] 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
matter. PlaintifFs tactical decision not to provide timely expert reports is not the responsibility of the 
Eagle Gate Parties and Plaintiff alone bears the responsibility for foiling to do so. 
15
 PlaintifFs suggestion at the hearing that it needed additional information in order to demonstrate 
causation is also unpersuasive. The causation aspect of PlaintifFs case is not within the domain of its 
damages expert and would not preclude the Plaintiff from making an assessment of damages, even if only 
a preliminary assessment. 
12 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO, 040921860 
vs. 5 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, : 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, : 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
: 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it the Plaintiff's Motion for Relief From or 
For Reconsideration of the Court's Order on Summary Judgment. Having 
reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the Court rules as stated 
herein. 
After considering the parties' respective positions, the Court 
determines that the Plaintiff's current Motion, with respect to the issue 
of damages, is simply an attempt to re-argue or bolster the arguments 
made in its original opposition. However, even considering these re-
arguments, the Court remains convinced that the Plaintiff had adequate 
information such that it could submit timely expert reports (even if on 
a preliminary basis) to substantiate damages. The Plaintiff's ability 
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to provide such a report shortly after the Court rendered its summary 
judgment decision (with no additional discovery) confirms this reality. 
The Court further concludes that the Plaintiff has not met the standard 
for excusable neglect. It was simple inaction and lack of diligence on 
the part of the Plaintiff that led to the Court's ultimate decision to 
grant summary judgment. The Court can find no legal or factual grounds 
to reconsider this decision. 
There is an issue, however, as to whether the Plaintiff's equitable 
claims were subject to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. It 
does not appear that the Plaintiff's equitable claims were part of the 
Defendants' initial Motion, which was geared primarily to the lack of 
evidence to substantiate the Plaintiff's damages claim. The Court agrees 
that it was improper for this aspect of the Plaintiff's claims to be 
dismissed in a summary fashion, when the issue of whether the Plaintiff 
is indeed entitled to injunctive relief has never been fully briefed. 
The Court concludes that those claims survive. To the extent that the 
Court's prior Order may be inconsistent with this, it should be modified 
to accurately reflect that the equitable claims were not subject to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In closing, the Court notes that the Defendants have raised legal 
arguments as to the viability of the Plaintiff's equitable claims. Such 
STEVENS -HENAGER COLLEGE 
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arguments are more properly brought in the form of a dispositive motion, 
rather than an opposition to a Motion to Reconsider (particularly where 
those arguments were not made in the underlying Motion for Summary 
Judgment) . The Court will not consider the substantive merits of those 
arguments in their current context. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider in part and denying it in 
part. 
Dated this _day of May, 2008. ^*fc0Fty^ 
^u. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this / <A gay of May, 2008: 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Scott M. Lilja 
Lisa B» Bohman 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
36 S. State Street, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
Jennifer R. Eshelman 
Attorneys for Defendants Eagle Gate 
College, Provo College, Horwitz and Miller 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Wallace Rogers 
4376 South 2675 West 
Roy, Utah 84067 
Mark N, Brian 
Attorney for Defendants Iongi and Smith 
P.O. Box 173 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS -HENAGER COLLEGE, $ MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040921860 
vs, : 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, : 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, : 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by Defendants 
Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller seeking a ruling on 
their Motion to Strike Preliminary Expert Witness Report of Brad Townsend 
and the Affidavit of Brad Townsend. Based on the Court's prior rulings, 
including its recent ruling with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Relief From or For Reconsideration of the Court's Order on Summary 
Judgment, and on the grounds articulated in the Defendants' Motion to 
Strike, the Court determines that this Motion is well-taken and therefore 
granted. 
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This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
Dated this .day of May, 2008. 
$sfc 
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36 S. State Street, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
Jennifer R. Eshelman 
Attorneys for Defendants Eagle Gate 
College, Provo College, Horwitz and Miller 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Wallace Rogers 
4376 South 2675 West 
Roy, Utah 84067 
Mark N. Brian 
Attorney for Defendants Iongi and Smith 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, s CASE NO- 040921860 
vs. 5 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, : 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, s 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on July 28, 2009, 
in connection with the following Motions: Defendants Eagle Gate College, 
Provo College and Jana Miller's (the "Defendants") Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Evidence of Monetary Damages, Motion in Limine to Exclude Any 
Login Tracking Lists that Purport to Show Jana Miller's Alleged Access 
of Plaintiff's Database and Related Testimony, Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and 
Motion to Strike Portions of the Declaration of Vicky Dewsnup and Related 
Portions of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Also before the Court was the Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the Court took these various Motions under advisement for 
further consideration of the relevant legal authorities, the parties' 
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written submissions and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully 
informed, the Court rules as stated herein, 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
At the outset, the Court notes that the parties' various Motions to 
Strike are denied. The Court has noted the procedural and evidentiary 
objections advanced in these Motions, but declines to strike the matters 
at issue. Rather, the Court will consider these matters for what they 
are worth, bearing in mind the objections made. 
That brings the Court to the crux of the parties' arguments, as 
raised in their respective Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion 
for Summary Judgment. These Motions pertain to the Plaintiff's request 
for permanent injunctive relief under the following claims: (1) Utah 
Uniform Trctde Secrets Act; (2) interference with current and prospective 
economic relationships; (3) Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(*CFAA"); cind (4) the Utah Unfair Competition Act. 
In seeking summary judgment, the Plaintiff asserts that based on the 
undisputed facts, certain of the Defendants accessed its database while 
in the scope of their employment with Eagle Gate and Provo College and 
then used this information, including lead lists, to recruit the 
Plaintiff's employees and/or to solicit prospective students. The 
Plaintiff maintains that injunctive relief is required in order to 
prevent future incidents of the Defendants illegally accessing its 
confidential database or using information already obtained. 
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The Defendants, in turn, seek summary judgment on the basis that the 
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief fails as matter of law because 
there is no possible threat of ongoing or future harm. With respect to 
the Plaintiff's claims under the CFAA, the Defendants argue that based 
on the Court's prior rulings concerning damages, this claim fails as a 
matter of law. The Defendants further argue that injunctive relief is 
unavailable under the Unfair Competition Act. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
agrees with the Defendants as to the Plaintiff's claim for injunctive 
relief under the CFAA. In light of the Court's prior rulings, the 
Plaintiff cannot substantiate damages aggregating at least $5,000 in 
value and therefore cannot meet the statutory threshold for bringing a 
civil action under the CFAA. Further, consistent with the Court's prior 
observations, Ms. Dewsnup's general testimony concerning damages is not 
sufficient in this regard. 
The Court also agrees with the Defendants with respect to the Unfair 
Competition Act. Reading the plain language of the Act, it does not 
appear that injunctive relief is provided for as a possible remedy under 
the Act. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under 
the CFAA and the Unfair Competition Act, 
However, with respect to the Plaintiff's remaining claims for 
injunctive relief, the Court is not convinced that the evidence clearly 
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demonstrates that these claims are moot. nThe issue of injunctive relief 
is moot when the x events make it absolutely clear the alleged wrongful 
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.'" Modular Mining 
Systems, Inc. v. Jigsaw Technologies, Inc., 2009 WL 1162893 (Ariz. App. 
Div. 2) (quoting SAL Leasing, Inc. v. State ex. rel. Napolitano, 10 P.3d 
1221, 1221 (Ariz. App. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added) . The Court is not persuaded that the facts in this case make it 
^absolutely clear" that there exists no threat of future harm. Instead, 
the Court determines that this issue, as presented in this specific case, 
is factuaLly intensive and warrants a trial on the Plaintiff's 
entitlement to injunctive relief. The record before the Court indicates 
that some Level of improper access did occur previously. The mere fact 
that the employees who were involved in this activity were fired is not 
sufficient for the Court to determine that the case has necessarily been 
rendered moot, particularly where the future value of the information 
obtained remains in dispute. 
The Plaintiff's Motion likewise presents a set of factual issues, 
particularly with respect to the scope of prior access, the value of the 
information allegedly acquired, the extent of solicitation of prospective 
students based on lead lists and the quality and value of the information 
obtained for future purposes. Again, these are matters that the Court 
cannot determine summarily. 
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Notably, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants 
suggest that the Plaintiff's claims fail simply because they cannot prove 
damages (based on the Court's prior rulings) . At the same time, however, 
the Defendants' Motion in Limine states that where the Plaintiff is 
merely seeking injunctive relief, monetary damages are not relevant. In 
that Motion, the Defendants correctly indicate that the Plaintiff *need 
not show monetary damages to establish the need for an injunction -
rather, it must show the opposite: that it has suffered harm that is not 
compensable by monetary damages or any other legal remedy." 
The Court agrees that with the exception of the CFAA, which brings 
the amount of damages to the forefront, the issue of damages with respect 
to the Plaintiff's remaining claims is indeed irrelevant. Therefore, 
contrary to the Defendants' argument in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Plaintiff's inability to prove monetary damages does not 
provide a basis for granting summary judgment with respect to its claims 
for injunctive relief. Rather, if the Plaintiff can meet the standard 
concerning the threat of harm, for which it does not need to introduce 
evidence of monetary damages, it can potentially succeed in its equitable 
claims. 
To summarize, the Court determines that there are a number of 
factual issues in this case which preclude the Court from determining as 
a matter of law whether or not injunctive relief is warranted in this 
case. Therefore, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
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Summary Judgment in the entirety. The Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Further, the Defendants' 
Motion in Limine regarding evidence of monetary damages is granted. 
Finally, as to the Defendants' remaining Motion in Limine, the Court 
is unwilling to entirely exclude all login tracking lists, and related 
evidence, that potentially show access of the Plaintiff's database by Ms. 
Miller. The Court is willing to consider an adverse inference as a 
potential remedy for spoliation of evidence. The scope and content of 
this adverse inference will be addressed at the time of trial. The 
Defendants' Motion in Limine to exclude the login tracking lists is 
denied. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
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